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After a brief review of historical and contemporary trends in the study of the social-
interactive nature of cognition, a definition of the interactive minds paradigm is pre-
sented. Cognition is social-interactive in nature in at least three respects (a) its cultu-
ral evolution as well as its ontogeny, (b) its activation and application, and (c) its
recognition. But is it true that two heads are better than one? An empirical «interac-
tive minds» paradigm was developed and tested using the sample case of wisdom-rela-
ted performance. Five performance settings were developed which differed in the ratio
of individual and interactive cognition and its ecological relevance. Results revealed
that the condition combining individual and interactive cognition, that is, dialogue
and appraisal, was most facilitative for the activation of wisdom-related knowledge
and judgment. Thus, not any interactive cognition seems to be facilitative but rather
a s equential combination of both individual as well as interactive cognition.
The social character of the human mind and human behavior has long been ac-
knowledged. Probably one of the first «experimental studies» in this respect was
conducted by the German Emperor Friedrich II in 12th century. He wanted to
investigate the question which language neonates would develop, if they were
raised without social context. Would it be Hebrew, Latin, Greek or the mother
tongue of his/her parents? The sad result of his study is well known – all neonates
had died before they were able to even speak one word (Francescato, 1973).
Human behavior develops in transaction with social forces. The social or con-
textual embeddedness of the human mind seems to constitute an important facet
of the conditio humana. Dating back as far as to the sixth century BC, Heraklit
has pointed out in his work «The Nature»: «Although the sense is one of a com-
mon mind, most live as if they would have their own reason». Already at the be-
ginnings of modern psychology we can find dialectic views on the relation be-
tween the individual and the collective, as illustrated in the writings of William
James, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. In the work of George Herbert
Mead, for instance, James’ functionalism led to the formation of symbolic inter-
actionism. This trend can also be found in late 19th century sociology. It was
Thema
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Durkheim who discussed the social dependencies of thought and knowledge.
Later such ideas were taken up again, for instance, in Moscovici’s social psycho-
logy. Bartlett was probably the first in cognitive psychology who seriously con-
sidered the social nature of cognition when formulating his schema-theory of
memory.
In experimental social psychology the investigation of effects of social context
on behavior and learning can be traced back to an early study by Triplett in
1897. He demonstrated that the speed of bike-riding was higher when riding in
a group than when riding alone. Turning from cognitive and social psychology
to developmental psychology, the origins of socio-genetic thinking can be traced
back to the often neglected French psychiatrists Pierre Janet and his contempo-
rary James Baldwin. Janet and Baldwin had strong influences on the succeeding
generation of socio-genetic thinkers such as Piaget and Vygotsky. After these be-
ginnings, the investigation of the social nature of cognition has been revived in
the 70s of this century. In developmental psychology this is linked to scholars
like Riegel and his dialectic psychology or Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model of
development and the beginnings of lifespan psychology (Baltes, Rees, and Lip-
sitt, 1980). Similarly, the interactionism debate, with its call for more explicit
consideration of interactive and transactional conceptions in various fields of
psychology, has to be mentioned in this context (e.g., Endler and Magnusson,
1976).
More recently, several concepts linked to the social character of human mind
and behavior have emerged. Concepts, such as shared knowledge, mutual
knowledge, situated cognition, distributed cognition, social mind, collaborative
memory, group processes in cognition, socially situated cognition, cooperative
cognition, highlight the role of social interaction in the development, activation
and evaluation of cognition (e.g., Baltes and Staudinger, 1996; Bar-Tal and
Kruglanski, 1988; Bornstein and Bruner, 1989; Dixon, 1992; Levine; Resnick,
and Higgins, 1993; Resnick, Levine, and Teasley, 1991; Sternberg, and Wagner,
1994; Wozniak and Fischer, 1993; Wyer and Srull, 1986). Most of the recent ap-
proaches to the social-interactive nature of the mind stress the importance of ex-
tending existing empirical paradigms beyond the isolated individual. They sug-
gest incorporating the collective and social-interactive facets of human mind and
behavior, thereby opening new prospects on the study of cognition. Despite this
insight and call for new paradigms there still is a mismatch between theory and
empirical study.
One persuasive exception is the enrichment and transformation of social-
learning theory by cognitive dimensions to better understand the social and col-
lective foundations of action and thought (e.g., Bandura, 1986). Another ongo-
ing search for a better representation of collective and social-interactive
perspectives in psychology is the recent stream of «postmodern» efforts to artic-
ulate reality as social construction (Neimeyer, Neimeyer, Lyddon and Hosh-
mand, 1994). To be mentioned also are recent debates about collectivism versus
individualism (Miller and Prentice, 1994). The recent revival of interest in the
social-interactive nature of human cognition is also illustrated by several review
articles and edited volumes (e.g., Bar-Tal and Kruglanski, 1988; Bornstein and
Bruner, 1989; Cohen and Siegel, 1991; von Cranach, Doise, and Mugny, 1992;
Forman, Minick, and Stone, 1993; Levine, Resnick, and Higgins, 1993; Light
and Butterworth, 1992; Resnick, Levine, and Teasley, 1991; Rogoff and Chava-
jay 1995; Sternberg and Wagner, 1994; Wozniak and Fischer, 1993).
Theoretical Perspectives on Interactive Minds
and Lifespan Development
Interactive Minds – a New Metaphor
In the present article, we focus on the concept of interactive minds, that is one
of the recent terms denoting the social nature of human cognition (Baltes and
Staudinger, 1996). For three interrelated reasons, it was decided to introduce still
another concept: (1) to keep open the outcome directionality and valence of so-
cial interaction, (2) to coin a metaphor with effective imagery implicating social
interaction and transaction, and (3) to preserve the unique psychological em-
phasis on individuals as the basic units of interaction.
(1) The search was for a term, while clear in its social-interactive meaning,
that was unbiased as to the direction and the valence of the performance out-
come. Despite the fact that it was believed that social interaction (over different
domains as well as ontogenetic time) in general enhances performance, a lot of
research literature demonstrates, that not all social interactive conditions im-
prove performance (e.g., Hill, 1982; Stroebe, Diehl, and Abakuomkin, 1992).
There are many possibilities why people may not effectively interact with each
other, among those reasons are motivational reasons or distraction due to atten-
tional load, differences between the interactive partners in level of functioning,
differences in knowledge or talent, or incompatibilities in styles of problem solv-
ing. Furthermore, issues associated with the proper sequencing and combination
of social transactions in the problem-solving process, with person-centered
phases of activity, are of concern. Differences in the nature of cognitive tasks lead
to different expectations about the degree of performance improvement through
social interaction (Staudinger, 1996). Also genetic arguments may account for
directional openness of performance outcomes within social transactions. The
evolutionary-psychological approach to the study of mind (Barkow, Cosmides,
and Tooby, 1992) can be viewed as an example. This approach emphasizes that
phylogenetic earlier adaptations of human-environment transaction, due to their
relatedness to space and context, may have involved brain-related dispositions
that may not be functional in today’s world. Gains and losses that arise from so-
cial interactions, then, can have their origin both in evolution-based genetic pre-
dispositions as well as in the constellation of performance factors that define a
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given social transaction during ontogenesis and microgenesis of intellectual per-
formance.
(2) The second reason for introducing the term interactive minds was the
search for a concept with good metaphorical properties because metaphors have
been shown to be powerful regulators and modulators of theoretical efforts in
psychology (Leary, 1990) as well as in cognitive development in particular
(Sternberg, 1990a).
(3) The third reason for finding a new metaphor was that although identify-
ing at least three metaphors (the epistemological, sociological, and the anthro-
pological) that are concerned with the role of social interaction in the evolution
and ontogenesis of mind, none of these metaphors is specifically focused on so-
cial-cognitive interaction. Moreover, the two metaphors closest to and most ex-
plicit in their social orientation in evolution and ontogenesis, the sociological
and anthropological ones, lie outside the field of psychology. Since psychology
seeks a unique location in the spectrum of behavioral and social sciences with its
own person- and behavior-centered concepts and empirical methods of inquiry
and since the basic units for psychological theory and research are individuals
and their mind-based resources, it was important to look for a metaphor that
makes explicit the individual-level focus of psychology but at the same time sug-
gests the social characteristics of mind.
Interactive Minds in the Context of the Propositions of
Lifespan Psychology
The notion of interactive minds is closely linked to lifespan psychology, which
will be illustrated next. Lifespan psychology can be described as metatheory con-
sisting of a family of guiding propositions or principles about the nature of hu-
man ontogenesis and about the ways how to best study it (e.g., Baltes, 1987).
Lifespan theory provides perspectives that are consistent with arguments about
the role of social and cultural factors in human behavior advanced by other re-
search traditions such as cultural psychology (see also Boesch, 1991). Based on
the commitment of lifespan theory to the social nature of human development,
we find a strong interest of lifespan researchers in social-interactive paradigms
(e.g., Baltes, and Staudinger, 1996, Dixon and Gould, 1996). Lifespan psychol-
ogy can be described by six major propositions (see also Baltes, Staudinger, and
Lindenberger, 1999):
The first proposition that human development extends from conception
through death, hints at the variety of contexts and social transactions in which
cognitive development and cognitive functioning can take place. As to the study
of interactive minds, a lifespan view provides a first look at the sequencing and
patterning of social interactions, as they occur at one point in time as well as in
sequence including such interaction partners as parents and kin, peers, teachers,
colleagues, friends, life companions, marriage partners, and staff in care institu-
tions, and their relative impact at different points in the life course. The second
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notion of the multidimensionality and multidirectionality of developmental tra-
jectories suggest that the quality and effectiveness of interactions can vary be-
tween types of interactions (e.g., parents vs. peers), and that interactive function-
ing in earlier life phases may involve protective and risk conditions for later stages
of the life course. One may consider for instance the structure and function of so-
cial networks that as convoys (Kahn and Antonucci, 1980) generate a matrix of
interactive minds across the life course. The third proposition of simultaneity of
gains and losses in development points to the view that development is neither
mere growth nor mere decline but rather multifunctional (M. Baltes, 1995). For
instance as children acquire their mother tongue, they experience some recogni-
tion and production losses regarding sounds not contained in their primary lan-
guage. The fourth proposition of plasticity in human development points to the
question of the «zone» or «norm of reactions» of possible development and to the
role of social factors contributing to this. Thus one may ask, in which way inter-
active minds can and do optimize the activation of latent potential, or to what de-
gree are dysfunctions or lacking abilities compensated for by the interaction be-
tween minds? The last two propositions, historical embeddedness and
contextualism stress not only the important role of individual, social and cultural
context but also the consideration of contexts of human development along spa-
tial and temporal dimensions.
Towards an Empirical Paradigm to Study Interac-
tive Minds
Interactive minds refers to «the acquisition and manifestation of individual cog-
nitions that influence and are influenced by cognitions of others and that these
reciprocal influences between minds contribute to the activation and modifica-
tion of already available cognitions as well as to the generation (development) of
new ones» (Baltes and Staudinger, 1996, p. 7). Four aspects of interactive minds
need to be taken into account when attempting to study the social nature of so-
cial cognition: (1) proximity of interaction, (2) level of manifestation, (3) pre-
requisites, and (4) evaluative criteria.
Proximity of the Interaction
First, we have to consider that calling an interaction social is not precise enough.
It is necessary to clarify the degree of proximity of the interaction. The basic dis-
tinction is one between two different types of interaction: direct interaction and
indirect interaction. Direct interaction refers to an interaction setting where one
or more interaction partners are physically present. Thus, interaction partners
can actively collaborate or are physically present. Investigations by social psy-
chologists concerned with group problem solving and social facilitation are good
examples of these two different kinds of direct interaction. Indirect interaction
refers to the situation when interaction partners are not physically present but
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the interaction between partners is symbolically mediated. On the distal end of
this dimension, symbolically mediated interaction takes place between the per-
son and what cultural anthropologists call cultural artifacts (e.g., Cole, 1996) of
any kind, such as objects, written material or institutional structures. The second
meaning of symbolically mediated interaction is interaction that takes place
within a person’s head by means of mental representations about another person.
These mental representations can refer to the future, the past or an ideal. An in-
creasing number of studies has demonstrated that mental representations can
have strong qualitative as well as quantitative effects on the cognitive perform-
ance of an individual (e.g., Staudinger, 1996).
Level of Manifestation
The second aspect of interactive minds refers to the different levels on which in-
teractive cognitions may take place. First, interactive cognitions may have left
their traces in the history of human kind, that is in the evolution of the human
mind. This is probably a source of influence which is often neglected. But sec-
ond, social interaction, in its varying degrees of proximity, plays a crucial role in
the ontogenesis of an individual. And finally interactive cognitions are impor-
tant for the microgenesis of cognitive outcomes. Referring to the evolutionary
basis of social cognition, Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) argue that human
beings belong to one of the rare species which conduct reciprocal altruism and
that this had led to specific cognitive structures and functions. For instance, the
human mind seems to be well prepared to discover violations of the basic rules
of reciprocal altruism, for instance if a person claims advantages without refund-
ing anything. Cosmides (1989) as well as Gigerenzer (1996) argue furthermore
that the human brain may have several of such modules for different areas of
cognition. Child developmental research supports this assumption with the
finding that infants first learn to decide whether they want to interact with a liv-
ing or non-living object and based on this decision apply a different logic re-
spectively. Along these lines, one could examine if the four kinds of human so-
ciality described by Fiske (1992) come along with such cognitive modules as
they were suggested by evolutionary psychologists. Fiske distinguishes between
(1) communal sharing, i.e. same dealing for all interaction partners, (2) author-
ity ranking, (3) equality matching, i.e. a relation that is orientied towards equal-
ity in taking and giving, and finally (4) market pricing, i.e. people orient their in-
teraction according to offerings and demand.
From evolution to ontogenesis: What role does direct interaction, as de-
scribed above, play in cognitive development? Research concerned with peer and
child adult interaction has revealed that children who have not yet developed
communicative and collaborative skills gain less and less from social interaction
as task difficulty increases. For young children social interaction and task effort
are a kind of a dual-task setting. One can even find that children are only con-
cerned with solving the task while completely forgetting the interaction. It is
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only with older children and in adolescence that the gain from social interaction
is less dependent of task difficulty (e.g., Azmitia, 1996). Azmitia and Perlmutter
(1989) proposed five mechanisms which they suggest influences cognitive devel-
opment during social interactions: Imitation, conflict, dealing, guidance and co-
construction. Implicit in this order is first the varying importance of these mech-
anisms at different life stages and their differential impact on various kinds of
learning. Research on the impact of social interaction on cognitive ontogenesis is
one of the few examples which led to concepts of intervention such as the con-
cept of reciprocal teaching suggested by Brown and others (1992). Turning from
the beginning of life span development to advanced age, so far only few studies
have investigated the influence of social interaction on cognitive development in
adulthood and old age. Most likely during ontogeny of the human mind, a his-
tory of social interactions influence a person’s knowledge and way of thinking
that supports the adaptive interaction with cognitive demands. It is also possible
that task demands are split between members of a cognitive network which can
in turn lead to one person’s further development or diminution of cognitive abil-
ities. Support for this assumption, for instance, comes from investigations of
transactive memory (Wegner, Erber and Raymond, 1991) which revealed that
such adaptive distribution of work in married couples takes place and that in
turn dissolution of these couples at first leads for both partners to the experience
of deficiencies in knowledge and abilities. In old age, direct and indirect social
interactions can be seen as an important support factor in the face of declining
abilities, especially in the area of fluid abilities or cognitive mechanics. Interac-
tion partners can mutually take over compensating functions.
Prerequisites and Process
The third dimension of interactive minds is concerned with the prerequisites
of the microgenesis of social interactions. For instance, it is important that each
partner has the necessary cognitive prerequisites to be able to perform the differ-
ent phases of the interaction. Also the personality structure influences the
process and outcome of social interactions. And finally, the interaction style cho-
sen may be crucial when predicting the result of the interaction process.
Evaluative Criteria
The fourth dimension refers to the criteria chosen for the evaluation of interac-
tive cognition. The interaction process can be described and evaluated on a cog-
nitive and/ or a socio-emotional level. In social-psychological group research the
emphasis has been on the socio-emotional level whereas in developmental psy-
chological investigations the focus more often has been on the cognitive level of
analysis.
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An Experimental Study of the Interactive Minds
Paradigm
Preceding theoretical discussions provided the basis for the development of an
empirical paradigm to study interactive minds. Wisdom-related knowledge and
judgment was chosen as an example area in which the effect of interactive minds
could be studied. In the following, the experimental paradigm developed to as-
sess the effect of a social-interactive context on wisdom-related performance will
be presented. Wisdom was chosen as a sample case to study interactive minds be-
cause it is the prototype of a collective construct. Wisdom could not develop
outside of a human community. Multiple lives are necessary to be compared for
wisdom-related knowledge to arise. Wisdom also is usually asked for in interac-
tive situations and wisdom can only be recognized by others. The isolated indi-
vidual could not be wise because no one could assign wisdom to this person. Fi-
nally, wisdom is a body of knowledge that may be too large and complex to be
fully represented in the mind of one person. Before the social-interactive wisdom
paradigm is introduced, however, it seems necessary as a frame of reference to de-
scribe the person-centered paradigm previously employed to assess wisdom-re-
lated knowledge.
Wisdom has been defined as an expert knowledge system in the fundamental
pragmatics of life (e.g., Baltes and Staudinger, 1993). This is a large body of
knowledge and heuristics concerned with the mastery of difficult and uncertain
problems related to life conduct and the meaning of life. Wisdom is defined as
superior knowledge of how to act for one’s own good, that of others, and that of
society. Wisdom becomes manifest in sound judgment and exceptional insight
into difficult life problems. The concept of wisdom is restricted to the expert-
level products of performances whereas any lower levels are denoted by the term
wisdom-related knowledge. The elicitation of wisdom puts very high demands
on knowledge and judgment. Thus, one may even argue that wisdom by defini-
tion will rarely be found in a single individual, but rather in contexts which are
constituted by multiple interacting minds.
To gain access to participants’ knowledge systems about the fundamental
pragmatics of life, three areas of thinking about the conduct and meaning of life
– life planning, life review, and existential life management – were selected (see
Baltes, Smith, and Staudinger, 1992, for more details). Short problem vignettes
describing scenarios covering these areas were developed. These scenarios vary by
age of problem character, by the typicality or normativeness of the problem, and
by the targeted life domain. In terms of an experimental setting, participants first
get some training in thinking aloud (Ericsson and Simon, 1984) and in dealing
with this type of task. Then they are given the wisdom task describing a problem
scenario of a difficult and uncertain life situation of a fictitious person, and are
asked to spontaneously think aloud about the problem, such as what to consider
and how to react when a friend calls and threatens to commit suicide. The tape-
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recorded and later transcribed verbatim records are then evaluated on the five
wisdom-related crtiteria that are 1) Rich factual knowledge about life, 2) rich
procedural knowledge about life, 3) lifespan contextualism, 4) value relativism,
and 5) recognition and management of uncertainty (see Baltes, Smith, and
Staudinger, 1992). The evaluation of responses is carried out by an expert rater
panel. Results revealed good interrater reliabilities with Cronbach alphas ranging
from .7 to .98.
In the attempt to move beyond person-centered paradigms, the goal was to
explore under which assessment conditions – involving cognitive as well as emo-
tional and motivational processes – social interaction would either support or
hinder the activation of wisdom-related knowledge and judgment. One starting
point of consideration was the question how people usually deal with difficult
life problems that require a certain amount of wisdom-related knowledge. In a
pilot study, it was found that people distinguish at least four ways of dealing with
difficult life problems (Staudinger and Baltes, 1996): (a) thinking about them by
themselves, (b) consulting other people whom they consider especially helpful,
or (c) taking into consideration what other people whose advice is usually sought
might say to this problem, or (d) «consulting» informational sources potentially
helpful for the problem at hand, be it books or long-term memory. These four
conditions vary along a dimension which was labeled above as proximity of so-
cial interaction – a dimension ranging from actual interactions between two peo-
ple through symbolic interaction with mental products of other people (cultural
artifacts). Along this dimension one can distinguish between two basic forms of
interactive minds. The first and most proximal condition is the external dialogue
(subsequently referred to as external dialogue plus individual appraisal) between
at least two persons actually present. The second condition on the distal end of
this dimension refers to one person having an internal dialogue or virtual dia-
logue (subsequently referred to as internal dialogue) with the mental representa-
tion that he or she has of another person’s opinion or knowledge system.
Based on these pilot results and the study of the group problem literature in
social psychology, five experimental settings were developed. In the following
they are described in the order of their assumed facilitative effect on wisdom-re-
lated performance (for more details of the study see Staudinger and Baltes,
1996). The greatest increase in performance was expected for the experimental
condition called «dialogue plus individual appraisal». This experimental condi-
tion first provides a natural dyad with the opportunity to discuss a wisdom task
in any way they like for 10 minutes. Then each member has 5 minutes to think
about the task on their own in separate rooms before each is asked to respond in-
dividually. The second setting, called internal dialogue, provided for a 10 minute
period in which each individual participant was asked to think about the wisdom
task taking into consideration what other people, whose advice they valued,
might have to say about the problem. A lower performance increase than for the
two conditions just described was expected for the «dialogue» and «inner mono-
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logue» condition. In the «dialogue» condition, a natural dyad had 10 minutes to
discuss a wisdom task the way they like. Immediately afterward they were asked
to respond individually. The «inner monologue» condition provided for 10 min-
utes of individual thinking time after the participant had been presented with the
wisdom task. Finally, the lowest wisdom-related performances were expected of
the traditional standard wisdom procedure, in which the participant was asked to
think aloud by himself immediately after being presented with the wisdom task.
These five experimental conditions were applied to a sample consisting of
122 natural dyads. Thus, there were a total of 244 participants (148 women, 96
men). The sample, recruited with the assistance of a German survey research
company, was very heterogeneous, with regard to education level, occupation,
and the adult age range, about half were younger adults (20-44 years), and half
were older adults (45-70 years; for more detail of sample composition see
Staudinger and Baltes, 1996).
Three wisdom-related tasks were used to assess wisdom-related knowledge
and judgment. The first task, called suicide task, describes a situation in which a
person receives a call from a good friend who communicates his or her decision
to commit suicide. The second was a life-review task in which a fictitious person
is confronted with a meaning-of-life question. The third task was a non-norma-
tive life-management problem that dealt with a young girl who wanted to move
out of her parents’ home.
Analysis of variance demonstrated that the dialogue and individual appraisal
condition as well as the inner dialogue condition showed performance levels one
standard deviation higher than the standard condition. The inner monologue
condition produced significantly lower levels of performance than those two.
And the dialogue and the standard condition demonstrated the lowest level of
performance, and did not differ from each other. No main effects or interaction
with gender were found (for statistical details of the study see Staudinger and
Baltes, 1996).
This first study implementing a social-interactive paradigm to investigate
wisdom-related performance seems to offer some support in disentangling the
contribution of individual and interactive components of cognition on wisdom-
related performance. The setting combining interactive and individual cogni-
tion, that is, dialogue and individual appraisal, increased performance levels by
one standard deviation, whereas the dialogue condition that gives primacy to ac-
tual interactive cognition did not significantly increase performance as com-
pared with traditional person-centered wisdom paradigms. It seems that per-
formance settings, to be most facilitative of wisdom-related performance, should
include an ideal balance between interactive and individual components of cog-
nition. According to the findings of the study, it does not seem to make a differ-
ence whether two interacting partners actually interact with each other (proxim-
ity of interaction) or whether this interaction is mediated through mental
representations of other person’s advice. Actually symbolically mediated interac-
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tion may even have the advantage of leaving it open to the person to decide when
to access or use another person’s knowledge system thus providing for better co-
ordination and minimized socioemotional discordances.
Discussion and Conclusion
In sum, the overall outcome of the first study lend support to the guiding theo-
retical perspectives. The results supported the view that wisdom-related per-
formance profits from certain social-interactive contexts. Thus, any performance
setting that ignores the interactive-minds aspect of wisdom underestimates wis-
dom-related performance capacity. The outcome pattern across the five experi-
mental conditions was largely consistent with the predictions. As predicted, the
two interactive-minds conditions (external dialogue plus individual appraisal,
internal dialogue) that were judged to carry special ecological relevance and
functionality significantly increased wisdom-related performance levels. The
overall facilitative effect of the two ecologically relevant and, according to theo-
retical assumptions, functional conditions involving interactive minds (external
dialogue plus individual appraisal, internal dialogue) was substantial.
The two control conditions, which did not prompt for the interaction of
minds (individual-thinking-time condition and standard condition), showed
only low or no performance increases. In the third control condition (external
dialogue without individual thinking time), which was judged to be less ecolog-
ically relevant and functional, participants also behaved as predicted. From a the-
oretical point of view, this condition was judged to be less effective due to the
lack of opportunity to reflect about the information exchanged and activated
during the dyadic discussion. In sum, the basic hypothesis of this attempt to ap-
proach the study of wisdom using interactive-minds settings was supported.
With regard to the theoretical claim of symbolic interactionism (e.g., Mead,
1934; Vygotsky, 1978) and related interpretations (e.g., Baltes and Staudinger,
1996; Rogoff and Chavajay, 1995; Wertsch, 1991), it is interesting to note that
interaction with others can be external as well as internal. Interaction with the
mental representation of other persons’ knowledge (internal dialogue) was as
powerful a facilitator of wisdom-related performance as was actual social inter-
action with another person when subsequent individual thinking time was pro-
vided. It can not be known of course, whether the processes associated with in-
ternal and external exchanges between interacting minds are similar. What can
be derived from the study is that both conditions produced significant perform-
ance enhancements. It seems critical that future researchers create experimental
settings in which both conditions are presented in various combinations and se-
quences to decompose the separate and joint effects of interactive minds associ-
ated with internal and external exchanges.
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One may wonder why the external dialogue between members of a natural
dyad (without supplementary individual thinking time) did not produce higher
levels of wisdom-related performance. As argued earlier, the design carried this
performance setting as control condition and it was therefore expected to result
in lower performance increases than the two experimental conditions (external
dialogue plus, internal dialogue). The failure to produce performance increases
might have been due to the absence of an opportunity for further thought
processes about the dialogue. This can be inferred from the fact that the exter-
nal-dialogue-plus condition produced not just a performance enhancement ef-
fect, but the strongest one. Therefore, it seems that in the external-dialogue-plus
condition, participants had the possibility to integrate ideas raised during dis-
cussion. This finding is in line with research on the effect of collaboration on
cognitive development in childhood and adolescence (cf. Azmitia, 1996; Rogoff
and Chavajay, 1995). These studies showed that it is not during the interaction
between peers or between adult and child that improvements in cognitive per-
formance are observed, rather, improvements are observed subsequently, during
the child’s individual performance.
Taking wisdom-related performance as a sample case, it was demonstrated
that by restricting research to the isolated individual without referring to factual
or «virtual» exchanges with other minds, one is likely to underestimate cognitive
performance potential. When comparing the performance levels under interac-
tive-minds conditions with results obtained in earlier work (cited above) a win-
dow on the cognitive potential seems to be opened. Future research should in-
clude social-interactive paradigms in the study of many developmental domains
to do better justice to the social nature of human kind.
Notes
1 The data reported in this article were collected as part of the project «Wisdom and Lifes-
pan Development» conducted at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and
Education, codirected by Paul B. Baltes and Ursula M. Staudinger (1992-1999). We gra-
tefully acknowledge the assistance in data collection and organization by Susanne Böhmig,
Marcel Braß, Simone Elsing, Gabi Faust, Claudia v. Grothe, Kerstin Haenel, Irmgard
Pahl, and Gisela Schubert.
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«Interactive minds» – Ein Paradigma zur Erforschung der
sozial-interaktiven Natur menschlicher Kognitionen und ihrer
lebenslangen Entwicklung
Zusammenfassung
Nach einem kurzen Überblick über historische sowie aktuelle Entwicklungen in
der Forschung zur sozial interaktiven Natur des Denkens, wird eine Definition
des «interactive minds» Paradigmas vorgestellt. In mindestens dreierlei Hinsicht
sind Kognitionen von Natur aus sozial interaktiv: (a) in ihrer kulturellen Evolu-
tion und ihrer Ontogenese (b) in ihrer Aktivierung und Anwendung (c) und in
ihrer Bewertung. Aber ist es immer wahr, daß zwei Köpfe besser sind als einer?
Ein empirisches «interactive minds» Paradigma wurde entwickelt und beispiel-
haft im Bereich des weisheitsbezogenen Wissens überprüft. Fünf Versuchsbedin-
gungen, die sich im Verhältnis individueller und interaktiver Kognitionen, sowie
ihrer ökologischen Relevanz unterschieden, wurden entwickelt. Die Ergebnisse
zeigten, daß die Bedingung, die aus einer Kombination sowohl individueller als
auch interaktiver Kognitionen bestand, am förderlichsten für die Aktivierung
weisheitsbezogenen Wissens und Urteilens war. Es scheint, daß nicht jede inter-
aktive Kognition förderlich ist, sondern eher eine sequentielle Kombination aus
individuellen und interaktiven Kognitionen.
«Interactive Minds» – Un paradigme pour l’étude de la nature
socio-interactive de la cognition humaine et de son
développement tout au long de la vie
Résumé
Après un bref aperçu des tendances historiques et contemporaines dans l’étude
de la nature socio-interactive de la cognition, une définition du paradigme «in-
teractive minds» est présentée. La cognition est socio-interactive sous au moins
trois points de vue : a) dans son évolution culturelle de même que dans son on-
togenèse; b) dans ses modes d'activation et d'application; c) dans sa prise en
compte. Mais est-il toujours vrai que deux têtes valent mieux qu’une? Pour abor-
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der ces questions, le paradigme «interactive minds» a donné lieu à une recherche
dans le domaine des «connaissances reposant sur la sagesse». Cinq conditions ex-
périmentales ont été construites qui différaient dans le rapport entre cognition
individuelle et interactive ainsi que sur le plan de leur pertinence écologique.
Les résultats ont montré que la condition combinant cognitions individuelle
et interactive, c’est-à-dire dialogue et jugement, était la plus à même d’activer les
«connaissance liées à la sagesse» et le jugement. Ainsi, il semble que la solution la
plus efficace n’est pas une cognition interactive mais bien plutôt une combinai-
son séquentielle aussi bien d'une cognition individuelle et interactive.
«Interactive minds» – Un paradigma per l’esplorazione della
natura socialmente interattiva della cognizione umana e del
suo sviluppo durante l’esistenza
Riassunto
Dopo una breve sintesi degli sviluppi storici e attuali nella ricerca attorno alla na-
tura interattiva della cognizione umana, si propone una definizione del para-
digma «interactive minds». L’attività cognitiva si rivela essere socialmente inter-
attiva almeno da tre punti di vista: a) nel suo sviluppo culturale e nella sua
ontogenesi, b) nella sua attivazione e attuazione e c) nella sua valutazione. Ma è
sempre vero che due teste sono meglio di una? Il paradigma empirico «interac-
tive minds» è stato sperimentato nell’ambito del sapere che si mette in relazione
alla saggezza. Partendo da 5 situazioni sperimentali, diverse per il coinvolgi-
mento individuale e sociale dei soggetti e per la loro rilevanza ecologica, si è
constatato che l’attivazione del sapere e della capacità di giudizio basata sulla sag-
gezza è migliore quando sussiste una combinazione di elementi cognitivi indivi-
duali e sociali. Sembra che non ogni situazione di interazione favorisca l’attività
cognitiva, quanto piuttosto appunto una combinazione sequenziale di elementi
individuali e sociali.
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